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MANAGING THE MISINFORMATION
MARKETPLACE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS
Daniela C. Manzi*
In recent years, fake news has overtaken the internet. Fake news
publishers are able to disseminate false stories widely and cheaply on social
media websites, amassing millions of likes, comments, and shares, with some
fake news even “trending” on certain platforms. The ease with which a
publisher can create and spread falsehoods has led to a marketplace of
misinformation unprecedented in size and power. People’s vulnerability to
fake news means that they are far less likely to receive accurate political
information and are therefore unable to make informed decisions when
voting. Because a democratic system relies on an informed populace to
determine how it should act, fake news presents a unique threat to U.S.
democracy.
Although fake news threatens democratic institutions, First Amendment
protections for false speech present a significant obstacle for regulatory
remedies. This Note explores the ways these speech protections interfere
with the government’s ability to protect political discourse—the process that
enables it to function effectively—and proposes that the government regulate
journalists to ensure that people can rely on legitimate news media to receive
accurate information.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 1938, the New York Times reported panic and mass
hysteria throughout New York after radio listeners tuned into a broadcast of
Orson Welles’s rendition of The War of the Worlds, a fictional drama about
an alien invasion, and believed it to be true.1 After hearing the broadcast,
families across the state reportedly fled their homes in fear of a gas attack,
which lead to traffic and communications jams.2 How was it possible that
thousands of people could believe something so absurd?
As it turns out, the broadcast was not the problematic source of
misinformation that persuaded multitudes of listeners to adopt a mistaken
belief. Rather, the coverage of the hysteria was the “fake news” that deceived
people en masse. News media grossly exaggerated the public response to the
War of the Worlds radio program, expanding on a few anecdotal reports to
paint a picture of mass hysteria.3
Though the frequent use of the term “fake news” is relatively new, concern
over the spread of misinformation is not. In the internet age, false stories
have taken a new and troubling hold on the information marketplace. The
persisting belief that the War of the Worlds broadcast created mass hysteria
demonstrates how false news maintains a powerful grip on people’s
understanding of events, even after such information has been repudiated.
1. Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1938, at
1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1938/10/31/issue.html [https://perma.cc/
7BK8-EJGM].
2. Id.
3. David Emery, Did the 1938 Radio Broadcast of ‘War of the Worlds’ Cause a
Nationwide Panic?, SNOPES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/war-of-theworlds/ [https://perma.cc/28DG-M8FA].
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Technology has empowered false news publishers with the ability to
disseminate misinformation cheaply, rapidly, and widely and to use
deceptive techniques to shape public opinion.
This Note explores the ways in which false news in the internet age
receives broad First Amendment protections, yet ironically undermines a
core purpose of the First Amendment: to enable the free exchange of ideas
in public debate, which shapes public opinion and informs democratic selfgovernance. Though the term “fake news” has taken on many meanings in
public discourse, in this Note it refers to false statements of fact reported in
online media that readers would reasonably believe are true, including both
intentional lies and inadvertent falsehoods.4 Part I of this Note discusses the
philosophical beliefs that have shaped jurisprudential understanding of false
speech protection and explains how the fake news problem in the internet age
presents unprecedented threats to democracy. Part II describes the First
Amendment protections for false speech and analyzes the relationship
between these protections and the philosophical underpinnings of free speech
theory. Part III explains the inability to adequately restrict false speech under
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV proposes a way that the government
can use philosophical theories of free speech protection to reimagine
regulating fake news without violating the First Amendment.
I. THE GROWING FAKE NEWS PROBLEM AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
OF FALSE SPEECH PROTECTION
This Part provides background information on the fake news problem.
Part I.A examines the philosophical theories underlying false speech
protection and discusses the role of free speech in society. Within the context
of these philosophical theories, Part I.B explains why fake news presents
unique threats to U.S. democracy by causing confusion among news
consumers and sowing distrust in the news media.

4. The concept of fake news has existed for centuries, with mentions of “false news”
stories dating back to the 1500s and the term “fake news” used as early as 1890. The Real
Story of ‘Fake News,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-atplay/the-real-story-of-fake-news [https://perma.cc/YNT8-QZHA] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
More recently, the term “fake news” has become popular after proliferation of the term by
President Donald Trump on Twitter. President Trump has reappropriated the term, and has
accused reporters of publishing fake news to discredit legitimate stories when they are critical
of his actions. See Tamara Keith, How Trump Tries to Discredit What He Doesn’t Like with
‘Fake’ and ‘Phony’ Labels, NPR (Aug. 31, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
08/31/643798637/how-trump-tries-to-discredit-what-he-doesnt-like-with-fake-and-phonylabels [https://perma.cc/S5DU-M68Z]. Dictionary.com defines “fake news” as “false news
stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared or distributed for the purpose
of generating revenue, or promoting or discrediting a public figure, political movement,
company, etc.” Fake News, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fake-news
[https://perma.cc/K42T-VHB8] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
This Note adopts
Dictionary.com’s definition.
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A. Falsehoods: Philosophical and Historical Context
The value of protecting false speech has long been the subject of
philosophical debate. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defends false speech
protections because he believes that false opinions enable people to ascertain
the truth in free and open debate.5 Mill argues that ideological truth is not
innately or universally known but must be unearthed through debate. False
opinions have value, Mill says, because they provoke people to investigate
the proposition further, thereby leading to discovery of the truth.6 If
misguided ideas are censored, discovery of truth will be stifled.7 Continuous
debate requires people to defend and articulate the truth, thereby reinforcing
its vigor.8 In this way, free speech can furnish a “clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”9
In “On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns,”10
Immanuel Kant examines the moral prohibitions against deliberate false
speech: lies. Kant argues that all lies are harmful because they undermine
others’ dignity by preventing them from acting freely and rationally.11 When
speakers lie, they interfere with their listeners’ right to receive true
information and manipulate their ability to make informed decisions based
on fact.12 Furthermore, Kant argues that lies cause broader harm by
undermining speakers’ credibility, which, in turn, causes people to distrust
each other’s contentions.13 Together, Mill’s and Kant’s philosophies
embrace both a right to communicate ideas and a right to receive information
in open discourse.
Drawing on earlier philosophers, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. enshrined the concept of the “marketplace of ideas” in
American free speech principles. He wrote, “[T]he ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”14
Under this view, the free trade of ideas promotes a democratic system of
governance by allowing people to discover the ultimate truth of what policies
best serve society. Encompassing the tenets of both Mill and Kant, the
marketplace of ideas posits that individuals cannot expand their knowledge
5. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND
OTHER ESSAYS 5, 15, 18–54 (Mark Philip & Frederick Rosen eds., 2015).
6. Id. at 19–21, 35.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 35 (“[I]f [an idea] is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be
held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”); see also Christoph Bezemek, The Epistemic
Neutrality of the “Marketplace of Ideas”: Milton, Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood
and Freedom of Speech, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159, 166 (2015).
9. MILL, supra note 5, at 19.
10. Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns,
reprinted in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 162 (James W. Ellington trans., 2d ed. 1994).
11. See id. at 163–65.
12. Id.; Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006).
13. See Kant, supra note 10, at 163–64.
14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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unless they can freely assert their ideas and test them against the ideas of
others;15 a functional ideas marketplace presumes both that true ideas can be
discovered and that participants in free discourse are trying to uncover the
ultimate truth in good faith.16
B. Fake News’ Harmful Effects on Democratic Institutions
and the Electorate
James Madison wrote, “Public opinion sets bounds to every government,
and is the real sovereign in every free one.”17 Because democratic
government, in theory, must be responsive to public opinion,18 it is crucial
that people have the means to form reasoned opinions about public policy.
Traditionally, the news media enabled the public to form reasoned opinions
that, in turn, informed government action and oversight.19 However, a
growing fake news problem has accompanied the rise of social media and
sensationalism of traditional media. While newspaper readership has
declined, the amount of information distributed online, including false
information, has skyrocketed.20 The rise of social media has created a world
where people are inundated with news, both legitimate and fake—a world
that philosophers and scholars of the past never contemplated. Because an
informed public is vital to democratic self-governance, the rise of fake news
presents unique problems to U.S. democracy.
1. Prevalence and Nature of Fake News
The ease in spreading falsehoods creates a number of serious problems for
democratic institutions. Voters’ susceptibility to falsities undermines the
ability of the electorate to choose qualified candidates for office.21 Kant’s
objections to lies apply with greater force to the misinformation marketplace:
fake news produces a “blanket of fog” that interferes with the electorate’s
ability to make informed, rational decisions about candidates by “obscur[ing]

15. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012).
16. Annie C. Hundley, Fake News and the First Amendment: How False Political Speech
Kills the Marketplace of Ideas, 92 TUL. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2017). Similar to Kant’s belief
that people have a moral duty to tell the truth, Mill believed that people have a moral duty to
assert only the opinions that they sincerely believe. MILL, supra note 5, at 21 (“It is the duty
of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them
carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right.”); see
also SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 141
(2014).
17. For the National Gazette, [Ca. 19 December] 1791, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0145 [https://perma.cc/28EE86T2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
18. POST, supra note 15, at 14.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy),
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2017).
21. Staci Lieffring, Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly
False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1064 (2013).
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the real news and information communicated by campaigns.”22 Falsehoods
about elections disrupt voter ability to choose a candidate who represents
their interests, and they may also disincentivize voting entirely by confusing
voters about polling locations, voting times, and voter eligibility.23
Though political misinformation is not a new problem, the mass, targeted
distribution of fake news on social media has disrupted the marketplace of
ideas in entirely new and troubling ways. Social media allows political actors
to overwhelm users and disrupt their sense of reality by disseminating false
news and political ads to an unprecedented degree at unprecedented speeds.24
Because false stories are often more extreme or outrageous than true news,
they are more likely to be shared on social media platforms.25 “Parasitic
journalism”—the practice of reporting news produced by another source
without additional investigation—can exacerbate this problem.26 A recent
Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of Twitter found that “false
stories diffused ‘farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all
categories of information’” and that “[t]he truth, in other words, could not
rise to the top [of the marketplace of ideas] because the marketplace was
packed with lies.”27
The ease in uploading and distributing online content means that fake news
disguised as legitimate news spreads rapidly and reaches anywhere from
hundreds to millions of viewers.28 On social media, political entities use ads
or automated messages sent by bots to mass target specific demographics that
are particularly susceptible to deceptive messages, possibly tricking many of
these voters into voting against their interests.29
The 2016 presidential election demonstrates the ways these techniques can
be used to confuse and deceive on a massive scale. Fake news spread rapidly
during the 2016 election cycle; false pro-Trump articles were shared 30.3
million times and false pro-Clinton articles were shared 7.6 million times on
Facebook alone.30 A BuzzFeed analysis of top fake news stories during the
campaigns found that the twenty most shared false stories—stories that
originated from hoax websites or hyperpartisan blogs—generated more user
22. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63,
69 (2017).
23. Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1064–65.
This disproportionately affects
underrepresented populations, including women and minorities. Becky Kruse, The Truth in
Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech
Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129, 143, 159 (2001).
24. See Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, and Other Human Dispositions: Reflections
on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 48–49 (2018).
25. See Carol Pauli, “Fake News,” No News, and the Needs of Local Communities, 61
HOW. L.J. 563, 575 (2018).
26. Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment
Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 69 (2018).
27. Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 863
(2018) (quoting Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359
SCIENCE 1146, 1147 (2018)).
28. Varat, supra note 24, at 48–49.
29. See id.
30. Hasen, supra note 20, at 208.
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engagement than the top stories from major news outlets.31 These stories
asserted false claims that Clinton sold weapons to ISIS, the pope endorsed
Trump, and Clinton was disqualified from holding any federal office, among
other outrageous falsehoods.32 One fake news author who wrote a false story
claiming that thousands of fraudulent Clinton votes were found in an Ohio
warehouse admitted that he made up the entire story and took only fifteen
minutes to craft the viral piece that was ultimately seen by six million
people.33
Perhaps because stories with high shock value are more likely to become
viral, political conspiracy theories have gained traction in recent years and
have harmed individuals and businesses, as well as democratic institutions.
The conspiracy theory that the Sandy Hook shooting was a fake story
orchestrated by anti-gun lobbyists has led to harassment of victim’s
families.34 The “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory that the Democratic Party was
running a sex-trafficking ring out of a pizzeria led to the owner receiving
death threats and a man firing a gun inside the restaurant.35 These
conspiracies not only harmed specific entities, but also demonstrate the
susceptibility of some Americans to fraudulent news, however absurd, and
people’s growing distrust in their political opponents. After “false flag”
conspiracy theorists postulated that pipe bombs mailed to prominent
Democrats were sent by other Democrats to make Republicans seem radical
before the 2018 midterm election, New York Times writer Kevin Roose
commented that “[c]onspiratorial thinking has always been with us—the
grassy knoll, the moon landing, the Freemasons. But it has been
turbocharged . . . as cable news networks and pliant social media networks
allow hastily assembled theories to spread to millions in an instant.”36
The 2016 election also exposed the United States’s susceptibility to
manipulation by foreign actors. In 2016, Russian agents covertly influenced
American voters in the presidential election with the goal of sowing distrust
in the presidential candidates and American political system more
generally.37 Russian agents used false reports and automated bots to target
specific groups of people who were vulnerable to the deception, including
31. Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Election News Stories Outperformed
Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-newsoutperformed-real-news-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/JV6F-QJPD].
32. See id.
33. Hundley, supra note 16, at 498–99.
34. David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 178, 181 (2017).
35. Cecilia Kang, Fake News Onslaught Targets Pizzeria as Nest of Child-Trafficking,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/technology/fact-checkthis-pizzeria-is-not-a-child-trafficking-site.html [https://perma.cc/JP9U-LZ3K].
36. Kevin Roose, ‘False Flag’ Theory on Pipe Bombs Zooms from Right-Wing Fringe to
Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/business/
false-flag-theory-bombs-conservative-media.html [https://perma.cc/M66U-TNL3].
37. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia
Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/
us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/9MZ8-DHD5].
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journalists who were likely to share the fake stories.38 The prevalence of bots
on social media makes foreign interference even more troubling. Between
September 16 and October 21 of 2016, around 20 percent of all tweets about
the election were generated by bots.39 It is impossible to know where these
automated messages originated or who deployed them, demonstrating the
vulnerability social media users have to foreign fake news content.40 A
single Russian firm with fewer than a hundred agents generated content that
reached around 150 million Facebook users on behalf of the Russian state.41
2. Decline in Legitimate Media
Journalism adds value to society by providing factual information to
people who then can make informed decisions and form reasoned opinions.
Public policy professor Philip Napoli explains, “Journalism . . . produces
value for society as a whole (positive externalities) that often is not captured
in the economic transactions between news organizations and news
consumers . . . . [T]his leads to market inefficiency in the form of the
underproduction of journalism . . . .”42 This inefficiency threatens an already
declining market for legitimate news.43 Parasitic journalism furthers market
inefficiency because republishers draw viewership and revenue away from
legitimate sources that incur significant costs while producing high-quality
news.44
The prevalence of fake news also causes people to distrust and dispense
with news more broadly. Bots are often deployed to distribute the same false
stories through diverse sources to trick readers by creating the perception that
the fake news piece is more widely accepted than its true counterparts.45 This
“flooding” technique can cause people to stop trusting the media entirely; the
false-information overload means that people no longer know what to believe
and eschew both credible and unreliable sources alike.46 Professor Seana
Shiffrin explains that “deliberate misrepresentations undercut the warrants
we have to accept each other’s testimonial speech, . . . interfer[ing] with the
aims of free speech culture.”47 Repeated falsehoods in the media work
similarly by undermining viewers’ confidence in news as a source of factual
information. The problem is exacerbated by social media companies that
38.
39.
40.
41.

Hasen, supra note 20, at 206–07.
Persily, supra note 22, at 70.
Id.
Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-markzuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/558E-ZCES].
42. Napoli, supra note 26, at 89–90.
43. Hasen, supra note 20, at 203.
44. Napoli, supra note 26, at 69–70.
45. Fighting Fake News, YALE L. SCH. 5, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/
isp/documents/fighting_fake_news_-_workshop_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2U9-PSBL]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019). This tactic is so powerful it has even caused certain fake stories
to “trend” on social media. Id.
46. Varat, supra note 24, at 48–49.
47. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 117.
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cater news to their viewers. Technology allows these companies to use
algorithms to promote content they believe their viewers will like, which
creates echo chambers where users are exposed to the same information
repeatedly, without exposure to contradicting sources.48
Use of traditional media sources has already declined sharply in the
internet age, and distrust in such sources will likely contribute to the
continuance of this troubling trend.49 Fake news has already caused
confusion and distrust by flooding the news marketplace with falsehoods. In
a recent Gallup poll surveying Americans’ beliefs about the prevalence of
false news, on average respondents said that 39 percent of the news they see
on traditional news media is misinformation.50 In another poll, 58 percent of
respondents reported that the increase in news sources makes it harder to be
well-informed.51 These statistics demonstrate the growing trends of distrust
and confusion that result from the misinformation marketplace.
Distrust in traditional media harms the press’s role as a stabilizing
democratic institution.52 If people lose trust in traditional media because of
fake news, the press will be unable to serve its watchdog role as a check on
government. Because government accountability is largely motivated by a
watchful press, a decline in coverage or consumption could result in greater
corruption.53 Americans are already skeptical of the media. Although
84 percent of polled Americans agree that news media is “critical” or “very
important” to democracy, only 28 percent reported that it supports
democracy “well” or “very well.”54
A decline in traditional news media in favor of social media may also harm
democracy by allowing fake news propagated by politicians and their
supporters to flourish unchecked, which could potentially lead to higher

48. Fighting Fake News, supra note 45, at 4.
49. Hasen, supra note 20, at 202–03.
50. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans: Much Misinformation, Bias, Inaccuracy in News,
GALLUP (June 20, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/235796/americansmisinformation-bias-inaccuracy-news.aspx [https://perma.cc/6AJ8-BJA4]. In this poll,
traditional media included TV, radio, and newspapers. Id. Respondents reported that they
believe 65 percent of news they see on social media is misinformation. Id. In 2016, Gallup
reported that only 32 percent of Americans responded that they trusted the mass media “to
report the news fully, accurately and fairly,” in contrast with a peak level of confidence at
72 percent in 1976, following coverage of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Art
Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9AQW-W2Z5].
51. Jeffrey M. Jones & Zacc Ritter, Americans Struggle to Navigate the Modern Media
Landscape, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/226157/americansstruggle-navigate-modern-media-landscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/NV6T-LAZR].
52. Hasen, supra note 20, at 201–05.
53. Id. at 209–10 (explaining that higher levels of corruption in state and local
governments are directly correlated with newspaper coverage of those governments).
54. Zacc Ritter & Jeffrey M. Jones, Media Seen as Key to Democracy but Not Supporting
It Well, GALLUP (Jan. 16, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/225470/media-seen-keydemocracy-not-supporting.aspx [https://perma.cc/459P-T8GY]. An additional 27 percent of
people agreed that the news media is performing “acceptably” in supporting democracy. Id.
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levels of political corruption.55 While traditional news organizations once
served as intermediaries between the government and people, with “the
fostering of a well-informed and civically minded electorate” as their primary
purpose, now, social media organizations have overtaken the intermediary
role.56 But, unlike traditional news organizations, social media networks do
not have a principal purpose of safeguarding democracy or enabling truthseeking in the ideas marketplace.57
Furthermore, while political candidates and leaders in the past could
communicate with constituents only through TV, radio, and newspapers, they
now can reach the public directly through social media. Provocateurs can
use Twitter and Facebook to spread false messages and inflammatory
comments without filtration by legitimate media sources, which have
historically corrected fallacious and exaggerated claims.58
Without
legitimate news as a necessary intermediary, the government has a greater
ability to use false speech for nefarious purposes.59 Political leaders can use
false speech to discredit their critics, manipulate public opinion, or distract
the public from investigating government activities.60 In November, the
White House tweeted a doctored video involving an altercation between a
CNN reporter often critical of the president and a White House intern to
legitimize its revocation of the reporter’s press pass.61 Just two days before
the 2018 midterm elections, gubernatorial candidate Brian Kemp, who was
also Georgia’s secretary of state at the time, claimed without evidence that
Democrats tried to hack Georgia’s voter registration files amidst claims that
he was trying to suppress the minority vote to win his race.62
Fake news undermines democracy by inhibiting voters’ ability to make
informed political decisions and sowing distrust in legitimate media.
Because fake news is easy to produce and free to distribute on a wide scale,
the problem is unlikely to go away on its own.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Hasen, supra note 20, at 209.
Persily, supra note 22, at 74.
See id.
Hasen, supra note 20, at 212–14.
See generally Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 342 (2017).
60. Id. at 355.
61. Lukas I. Alpert & Rebecca Ballhaus, White House Posted Video That Exaggerated
Incident with CNN Reporter, Social-Media Firm Says, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:59 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-accused-of-posting-edited-video-thatexaggerated-incident-involving-cnn-reporter-1541703579 [https://perma.cc/E2WD-2GJ2].
62. See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence,
Investigates Georgia Democrats over Alleged ‘Hack,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/georgia-elections-kemp-voters-hack.html
[https://perma.cc/2G9L-QDWN]. Kemp did not use social media to make this announcement,
so legitimate media—acting as intermediary between Kemp’s office and the public—was able
to qualify his claims of hacking by saying that they were unsubstantiated. See id.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR FALSE SPEECH
Although fake news presents a number of threats to democracy, it is
protected by the First Amendment. This Part examines constitutional
protections for false speech. Part II.A explains the purpose of the First
Amendment and describes how false speech has been deemed valueless, yet
still worthy of protection by the Supreme Court. Part II.B analyzes United
States v. Alvarez,63 a case that struck down a statute that criminalized false
statements about receipt of military honors, to demonstrate the numerous
ways that the First Amendment protects false speech. Finally, Part II.C
discusses the ways in which First Amendment protections incorporate the
philosophical theories, described in Part I.A, that underpin free speech
values.
A. Constitutional Background
Because an informed public is crucial to democratic self-governance, a
primary purpose of the First Amendment is to protect public debate, the
means through which public opinion develops.64 U.S. democracy “depends
on [the public’s] joint engagement with and evaluation of competing
visions.”65 The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law
“abridging the freedom of speech”66 because public opinion is formed
through free and open discourse. Encompassing Millian principles, this
broad protection ensures that “everything worth saying shall be said” so that
knowledge can grow free from government suppression and people can assert
their collective will over their leaders.67 But, to ensure that free speech is
safeguarded, some things not worth saying, such as falsehoods, receive
incidental protection.68
Understanding First Amendment protections for false speech requires
knowing what constitutes a false statement of fact. In Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.,69 the Court held that, if a reasonable factfinder would conclude
that an expression of opinion implies a piece of information that is
“sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false,” it is a
statement of fact.70

63. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
64. POST, supra note 15, at 14.
65. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135,
1160 (2003).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67. See POST, supra note 15, at 14–16.
68. Shiffrin, supra note 65, at 1160 (“We want speakers to have full freedom in the
construction and dissemination of their intent. [Democratic] legitimacy depends on it.
Protection of the bitter alongside the sweet, then, may be a necessary condition of protecting
those valuable processes and outcomes provoked by insightful speech.”).
69. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
70. See id. at 21.

2634

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

The Court has oft repeated that false statements of fact have no
constitutional value.71 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,72 the Court
noted that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”73 In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,74 the Court reiterated that no false statement has
constitutional value because “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless
error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wideopen’ debate on public issues.”75 However, the Court noted that while
constitutionally valueless, some falsehoods require First Amendment
protection to ensure that the ideas marketplace flourishes.76 These
protections for false speech, explained in Parts II.B and II.C, protect the
creation and distribution of fake news.
B. United States v. Alvarez
While fake news presents serious threats to democratic institutions, First
Amendment jurisprudence raises substantial obstacles to regulation. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez demonstrates the constitutional
conflicts that arise from false speech prohibitions.77 In Alvarez, the Court
struck down the Stolen Valor Act, a law that criminalized stated falsehoods
The plurality articulated two
about receiving military honors.78
justifications. First, the Act could not be justified because the government
failed to demonstrate that false claims of military valor caused provable
harm.79 In defending the Act, the government asserted that it was common
71. Though the Court has stated this in absolute terms, it has, at other times, noted various
ways that falsehoods do have constitutional value. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
In United States v. Alvarez, discussed in depth in Part II.B, the concurring justices specify
many contexts in which false statements of fact have social importance. 567 U.S. 709, 733
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“False factual statements can serve useful
human objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment,
protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a
child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm
in the face of danger . . . .”).
72. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
73. Id. at 52. The Court, however, distinguished between believable falsehoods and
falsehoods that the public would not reasonably believe, like parodies, which have
constitutional importance as instruments used to critique public officials and figures. Id. at 50,
54.
74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75. Id. at 340 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
76. Id. at 340–41.
77. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
78. Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). The statute read, “Whoever falsely represents himself
or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). While the statute
broadly criminalized false representations, the Court read a scienter requirement into the
statute. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725–26 (plurality opinion) (discussing the harms caused by
lies by “pretenders”); id. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[The statute] may
be construed to prohibit only knowing and intentional acts of deception about readily
verifiable facts within the personal knowledge of the speaker . . . .”).
79. Id. at 725–26 (plurality opinion).
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knowledge that an aggregate of misrepresentations about military honors
would dilute the value of the awards.80 The Court, concerned about
establishing a precedent that would permit the government to restrict false
speech without any showing of palpable harm, struck down the statute.81 The
concurring justices agreed that the Act could be written more narrowly to
require a showing of specific or material harm, which would “help to make
certain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability . . . to roam at large,
discouraging or forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is
unlikely or the need for the prohibition is small.”82
Second, the plurality worried that the Act would create a dangerous
precedent for overly broad regulation of lies without a judicial backstop.83
The Alvarez plurality took issue with the fact that the Stolen Valor Act
applied to virtually all false statements about military valor without regard to
time, location, audience, or purpose and noted that it applied equally to false
claims made in public and to “personal, whispered conversations within a
home.”84 The Court’s fear was primarily one of second order. The plurality
opinion was not concerned with the protection of false speech but rather with
the ability of the government to declare entire categories of false speech
unconstitutional.85 The Court feared that it would not be able to draw lines
about which categories of false speech are constitutionally regulable when
these laws are challenged.86 The Court noted that:
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense,
whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper,
would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about
which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no
clear limiting principle. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.87

Granting the government a “broad censorial power” to regulate falsehoods,
the Court continued, would chill true speech because people would fear
selective prosecution.88 Avoiding a potential slippery slope where any
80. Id.
81. See id. The dissenting justices found that false claims about military service had
caused tangible harm and noted that, in one region of the United States, “12 men defrauded
the Department of Veterans Affairs out of more than $1.4 million in veteran’s benefits.” Id. at
743 (Alito, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 736, 738 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 722–23.
85. Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68
ALA. L. REV. 337, 383 (2016).
86. Id.
87. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR (Centennial ed. 2003) (1949)). While the two concurring justices were
concerned with protecting false speech, they also agreed that regulating false speech without
substantial limitations set a dangerous precedent: “the pervasiveness of false statements, made
for better or for worse motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or without
accompanying harm, provides a weapon to a government broadly empowered to prosecute
falsity without more.” Id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
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category of false speech could be regulated, including those that invite
potential for government abuses of power, the Court erred on the side of
caution and found it impermissible for the government to restrict any
falsehoods unconnected with a provable harm.89
The Alvarez Court left open the question of what standard of scrutiny
should be applied to false speech regulations. The plurality analyzed the
Stolen Valor Act—a content-based regulation that distinguished between
speech about military honors and all other speech—under a “most exacting
scrutiny” standard, which requires that the statute be actually necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest.90 In contrast, the concurrence
applied a “proportionality review” standard, which weighs the regulation’s
harm to free speech against the regulation’s justifications.91 The concurrence
chose this intermediate scrutiny standard of review because the restriction
did not present a “grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful
speech” as it concerned only false statements about “easily verifiable
facts.”92
The Supreme Court has not defined the standard of review applicable to
general false speech restrictions—one not limited to a particular topic. Such
a standard would likely hinge on whether a regulation on all false statements
of fact would be considered content-based. In Police Department v.
Mosley,93 the Supreme Court outlined two types of content-based speech
regulation: regulation based on viewpoint and regulation based on subject
matter.94 Viewpoint-based regulations involve restrictions that favor one
opinion over another, while subject-matter-based regulations involve
restrictions on certain topics, regardless of the viewpoints being expressed.95
However, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,96 the Court held that strict scrutiny
must be applied to any content-based speech regulation and that a regulation
is content-based if it makes distinctions based on the speaker’s message on
its face or if it “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.’”97 Under this rule, lies could be regulated under a lesser
standard based on the speaker’s intent to deceive rather than the content of
his message.98 For example, if two speakers made identical false statements,
one in error and the other in malice, the latter could be prosecuted without
strict scrutiny review because malicious intent to deceive, not the content of
his words, would subject him to liability. But, because any prohibition on all
falsehoods—whether made erroneously or deceitfully—would refer to the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id.; see also Greene, supra note 85, at 383.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724–25 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 731–32.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 95–96.
See id.
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
Id. at 2222 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 126, 132.
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false content of the speech, any restriction would almost certainly be subject
to strict scrutiny.99
Assuming the Court would apply strict scrutiny, it would require a false
speech regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.100 In Alvarez, the Court held that the protection of the
integrity of military awards was a compelling government interest but that
the statute could not be upheld because there were less restrictive alternatives
to achieving that goal.101 There, both the plurality and the concurrence
agreed that true counterspeech is an adequate remedy to false speech.102
Drawing on Millian principles, Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted, “The
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary
course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to
the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”103
Chastising the Stolen Valor Act as paternalistic, Justice Kennedy declared
that “[o]nly a weak society needs government protection or intervention
before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth. Truth needs neither
handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”104
The requirement that a false speech regulation be narrowly tailored to the
compelling government interest it purports to serve presents a major obstacle
to enacting such a regulation because “[n]o legislature could ever draft a
statute that invades an individual’s freedom of speech rights less than
allowing for discourse to blossom and thrive in free and open debate.”105 To
survive strict scrutiny review, “[t]he final constitutional hinge, therefore,
swings upon the effectiveness of truth.”106
C. Understanding False Speech Regulations from Two Perspectives
Though strict scrutiny review makes false speech regulation difficult, there
are a number of laws that constitutionally restrict false speech. In Alvarez,
the concurring justices stated that “many statutes and common-law doctrines
make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful.”107 Such
statutes do not suffer from the same constitutional defects as the Stolen Valor
Act, which lacked a provable-harm requirement and failed to establish any
limiting principle.108 Justice Breyer described several speech restrictions
that are permissible, including defamation and intentional infliction of
99. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2222.
100. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
101. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724–26, 729 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(“[W]hen the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the ‘least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656, 666 (2004))).
102. Id. at 727; id. at 738 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. at 727 (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 729.
105. Note, Victory Through Deceit: The Constitutional Collision Between Free Speech
and Political Lies, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 740–41 (2017).
106. Id. at 741.
107. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
108. See supra Part II.A.
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emotional distress torts; consumer fraud and perjury statutes; and statutes that
bar false claims about terrorist attacks or other disasters.109 Regulations
narrowing the scope of liability do so in three general ways: (1) “by requiring
proof of specific harm to identifiable victims”; (2) “by specifying that the lies
be made in contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to
occur”; and (3) “by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are particularly
likely to produce harm.”110
Defamation, consumer protection, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress laws fall into the first category of requiring specific proof of harm
and cover reputational, economic, physical, emotional, and privacy harms to
individuals.111 Perjury is an example of a prohibition in the second category,
as falsehoods in a courtroom are particularly likely to harm one party’s
liberty or property unjustly, in addition to harming the functionality of the
judicial system.112 Prohibitions on falsehoods about terrorist attacks are in
the third category, as they limit a narrow topic that is particularly likely to
produce public harms like panic.113
There are additional ways the law describes false speech protections. High
barriers for false speech liability can be understood as protecting speakers,
while the regulations themselves may be understood as protecting listeners.
Part II.A.1 explores the “actual malice” standard, which shields speakers
from liability for many false claims. Part II.A.2 then analyzes certain falseclaims regulations under a listener-based approach that seeks to shield
listeners from fallacious information.
1. Millian Protections for Speakers
The Supreme Court has safeguarded false claims by requiring a high mens
rea standard for liability. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan114—one of the
inaugural cases regarding First Amendment protections for false political
speech—the Court found that defendants can only be required to pay
damages to a public official for libel if a plaintiff proves that the false
statement was published with “actual malice,” that is, knowledge that the
claim was false or with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was
false.115 The Sullivan Court shared the same second-order concerns that the
Alvarez Court raised nearly fifty years later—that fear of liability for false
speech without significant barriers for plaintiffs to overcome would chill true
speech by “dampen[ing] the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible,” speakers.116 In this way, Sullivan protects speakers from
limitless liability over inadvertent false claims, and recognizes that the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 734.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 734–35.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 282 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
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“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate.”117 The Court emphasized
that protecting speakers, even at a cost to others, is fundamental to preserving
open discourse.118 In a later defamation case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court explained that Sullivan recognized a strict liability standard but that
requiring defendants to warrant that every published statement was accurate
to defend against liability would result in “intolerable self-censorship.”119
Defendants, fearing expensive litigation costs and damages awards, would
be unable to make any assertions absent personal knowledge of their truth.120
This approach draws on the Millian principle that laws should enable
speakers to engage in free debate and should eliminate barriers to such
participation.121
Since Sullivan, “actual malice” has been considered a quintessential
element of liability for false claims. In Alvarez, the plurality reaffirmed that
“falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First
Amendment” and that “[t]he statement must be a knowing or reckless
falsehood” for a court to impose money damages or criminal liability.122
Because actual malice is difficult to prove, this precedent often allows
speakers to make harmful false claims with impunity.
Gertz left open the possibility of more restrictive false speech laws. While
an actual malice standard is required to impose liability for defamation
targeting a public official, the Gertz Court held that a negligence standard
may apply in cases brought by private individuals provided that they can
prove actual injury.123 The Court reasoned that private persons, as compared
with public figures, have less access to channels of communication that
would allow them to correct lies and falsehoods and are therefore less able to
mitigate resulting reputational harms.124 Because private persons are more
susceptible to these harms, the state has a greater interest in protecting private
individuals than it does in protecting public figures.125 Gertz ties the
ineffectiveness of true counterspeech and resulting harm to the state’s
latitude in restricting speech.
2. Kantian Protections for Listeners
Though not directly addressed by the Alvarez plurality, the government
may constitutionally regulate falsehoods by looking to the effect on listeners.
Inherent in the conception of the marketplace of ideas is the ability of people
to rely on factual assertions to form reasoned opinions. Freedom of opinion
117. Id. at 271.
118. See id. at 281–82.
119. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
120. See id.
121. See supra Part I.A.
122. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion).
123. Gertz, 428 U.S. at 349. The Court thus created a negligence floor for defamation. Id.
at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“States may impose all but strict liability for
defamation . . . .”).
124. Id. at 344 (majority opinion).
125. Id.
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cannot exist without a factual basis for those opinions because “factual truth
informs political thought.”126 Protections for listeners are essential to enable
their participation in democratic discourse.127 Although Kant objected
specifically to lies, his reasoning can be extrapolated to falsehoods more
generally. From the listener’s perspective, a lie is indistinguishable from an
error, but both inhibit her right to receive information and her ability to
develop informed opinions.
Under a listener-based approach, listeners’ interests in receiving accurate
information are placed above speakers’ interests in speaking freely when
there is a power imbalance or unequal access to information.128 This
approach can be “characterized as involving those circumstances in which
speakers have special access to (or special authority about) information,
rendering listeners reliant on speakers’ testimony because they cannot easily
or readily verify what is said in another way.”129 This inequality occurs when
speakers create information or hold a monopoly over information.130
Of the false claims regulations discussed by the Alvarez concurrence,
consumer fraud and perjury exemplify where a listener-based approach
justifies the speech restrictions. Consumer protection statutes recognize that
commercial actors have far more information about their products and
services than consumers.131 Because of this informational imbalance,
consumers rely on commercial actors’ statements when deciding what to
purchase as they often cannot distinguish between high and low value
products or services.132 Consumers’ inability to determine whether a
commercial actor’s claims are true renders them particularly vulnerable to
deception, manipulation, and harm resulting from false claims, whether made
deceptively or mistakenly.133
Perjury statutes similarly consider inequalities of information between
speakers and their listeners. Judges, juries, and other government actors rely
on the statements made by people under oath to properly administer justice.
Often, those testifying have a monopoly over the information sought, which
underscores the importance of protections for listeners who rely on the truth
of speakers’ testimony in making important determinations.
Where the actual malice standard invokes a Millian approach to false
speech regulation by favoring speakers, a listener-based approach is more
Kantian, and recognizes that falsehoods interfere with listeners’ abilities to
freely make rational, informed decisions.134 Though both ways of
126. POST, supra note 15, at 29; see also supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
127. See POST, supra note 15, at 34 (“Cognitive empowerment is necessary both for
intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic legitimation.”).
128. See Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441,
441–42 (2019).
129. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 131.
130. Norton, supra note 128, at 446.
131. Id.
132. Napoli, supra note 26, at 61.
133. See Norton, supra note 128, at 446.
134. See supra Part I.A.
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understanding false speech prohibitions emphasize actual injury or potential
harm, Sullivan and Gertz made clear that mens rea is required for liability.
This requirement means that there is currently a dearth of legal remedies for
some forms of false speech that result in considerable harm.
III. IS FAKE NEWS REGULATION COMPATIBLE WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT?
Because fake news is created easily, dispersed rapidly, and consumed in
massive quantities, it is likely to persist absent regulation. Scholars,
legislators, and others have already set forth a number of proposals that aim
to combat the fake news problem. Part III.A analyzes proposed solutions to
the fake news problem both practically and constitutionally, and Part III.B
debates whether a speech-restrictive regulation would realistically fit into the
First Amendment jurisprudence described in Part II.
A. Inadequacy of Already-Proposed Solutions
In this Part, this Note examines why proposed solutions to the fake news
problem are inadequate in fighting false news. Part III.A.1 explains why
proposals that do not restrict false speech are unlikely to have a major effect
on the false news market, while Part III.B describes the ways proposed false
speech restrictions would fail strict scrutiny review.
1. Non-Speech-Restrictive Proposed Remedies Are Inadequate
While remedies that do not restrict speech on the basis of falsity would
almost certainly survive a constitutional challenge, they are unlikely to have
a major effect on fake news. Some have suggested that the harms caused by
fake news can be alleviated with educational programs devoted to media
literacy or increased academic emphasis on the importance of factchecking.135 Such programs could encourage skepticism toward online news
content and teach people to critically analyze its accuracy.136 But efforts to
educate people about the importance of fact-checking are unlikely to work
because news consumers are already aware of the prevalence of
misinformation in the news.137 Furthermore, efforts to educate people to
more readily tell when a story is false would probably fail because readers
are flooded with the same fake news from many different sources, which
often outnumber their legitimate counterparts, making fact-checking an
onerous and confusing process.138

135. Clay Calvert & Austin Vining, Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of Supreme Court
Observations and Adages, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 171 (2017); Fighting Fake News,
supra note 45, at 11.
136. Calvert & Vining, supra note 135, at 171.
137. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
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Others have floated the idea of an ethics code for political candidates to
encourage honesty in campaigns.139 Candidates who pledge to uphold a code
of ethics would either self-enforce or voluntarily subject themselves to ethics
determinations by a self-appointed body.140 Such an ethics code would
similarly fail to provide an adequate fake news remedy because, although
some fake news originates from leaders or candidates themselves, many false
stories about elections are created by third parties.141 Further, candidates
who already use their speech platforms to spew falsehoods would have little
incentive to pledge to uphold a campaign ethics code, particularly one that
has no enforcement mechanism.142
A number of legal scholars agree that amending § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA),143 which immunizes online content
providers from liability for unlawful user-generated content, would be a
prudent way to affect the ways in which online content is published and
distributed.144 Where print republishers of tortious or criminal speech would
be subject to liability, social media companies enjoy total immunity under
the CDA, even when their platforms are designed to encourage users to post
illegal content.145 A modified § 230 could shield social media services from
liability only if they take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful
content posted by their users.146 The threat of civil liability might alleviate
the fake news problem by incentivizing online content providers to remove
false, defamatory stories.147 Amending § 230 of the CDA to limit immunity
currently enjoyed by social media companies that actively encourage or
passively permit unlawful speech on their platforms would be a good start to
fighting the fake news problem.
Originally, § 230 was designed to encourage internet publishers to take
good faith measures to regulate their content, without liability for either
underscreening or overscreening content in efforts to filter unlawful, illegal,
or otherwise objectionable content.148 An amendment requiring these
companies to take reasonable efforts to screen and remove unlawful content
would revitalize § 230’s original goal by creating statutory incentives for
republishers to undertake remedial efforts to remove criminal or tortious
speech on their platforms for fear of republisher liability.149 Good faith
139. See Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1069.
140. See id.
141. See supra Part I.B.1.
142. See Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1068.
143. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
144. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage:
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 453–55 (2018).
145. Id. at 455–56; Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture: Online Defamation,
Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2016).
146. Citron & Wittes, supra note 144, at 471.
147. Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity: Fake News, Facebook, and the First Amendment, 35
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 669, 687 (2017).
148. Citron & Wittes, supra note 144, at 457–58.
149. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 (2017).
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requirements to censor content implicate fake news because they would
compel online publishers to remove reported defamatory speech. These
publishers would be incentivized to discourage users from posting such
speech in the first instance. Because online platforms can build their sites in
ways that protect both privacy and expression,150 reasonableness
requirements, coupled with the overscreening protections that already exist,
could plausibly encourage social media firms to develop ways to block bots
or known hoax websites from posting content.
However, it is doubtful that amending § 230 alone would eliminate fake
news distribution online. Though fear of expensive litigation might be
enough to persuade social media companies to remove defamatory content
after users report it, the actual malice requirement presents an obstacle. In
practice, only sizeable private actors with substantial financial resources
would initiate lawsuits against a social media giant because proving malice
is so difficult. Moreover, current tort law limits the power of a CDA revision
to stop fake news that is not defamatory: while false speech that harms
specific individuals would subject republishers to liability, falsehoods
creating general harm are currently unactionable.151 Fake news that causes
harm by distorting election issues or creating conspiracy theories is not
covered by current law, so an amended § 230 would do nothing to compel
online entities to block such content.
Another idea targeting online publishers directly is to enact sourcedisclosure requirements for online advertisements.152 This type of law would
require hosts of paid third-party content to provide viewers with information
about their sponsors.153 Much like the commercial sponsorship identification
laws that already regulate broadcast media, disclosure requirements for paid
online content might enable viewers to make more accurate inferences about
its truth.154 Online social media users seeing paid content could better assess
“where information is coming from, what values it might be representing,
[and] whose interests it might be serving” if they had more information about
its sponsors.155
Though useful, disclosure requirements for paid online advertisements
alone would fail to provide a full remedy to the fake news problem. Although
information about content sources would help viewers make better inferences
about content’s validity,156 the fake news stories that spread broadly and
rapidly across social media are often unpaid content.157 Sponsorship
150. Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challengecivil-rights-and-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/YE6Q-JMQG] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
151. Kruse, supra note 23, at 156.
152. See Hasen, supra note 20, at 217–18.
153. See Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press,
57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 685–89 (2015).
154. Stanislav Getmanenko, Note, Freedom from the Press: Why the Federal Propaganda
Prohibition Act of 2005 Is a Good Idea, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 251, 282 (2009).
155. Levi, supra note 153, at 665.
156. Getmanenko, supra note 154, at 282.
157. Levi, supra note 153, at 690–91.
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disclosures could potentially prevent manipulation by foreign actors using
paid content to influence elections but would otherwise have little effect.
Furthermore, protections for anonymous speech are strong,158 and it is
unclear whether this kind of requirement would survive a constitutional
challenge.
2. Speech-Restrictive Proposed Remedies Are Unconstitutional
While the proposals outlined above seek to remedy the fake news problem
by addressing its effects or the forums where it is dispersed, others aim to
restrict the false speech itself. Some states have sought to address the
harmful effects fake news has on democracy by restricting false speech
surrounding elections.159 Bans on false paid political advertisements or
campaign materials have been advanced as a potential solution to the fake
news problem and have been enacted in several states.160 One proposed law
would prohibit campaign slander.161 Another would deter false speech about
ballot initiatives by imposing criminal punishments.162 Another speechrestrictive idea is a proposed ban on false speech concerning election
administration, such as falsehoods about the time, place, or manner of
voting.163 These types of laws would aim to protect voters from
manipulation that would otherwise depress voter turnout.164
These proposed restrictions on false speech are unworkable in the context
of fighting fake news because they are powerless to stop its circulation and
are vulnerable to constitutional challenges as they fall outside the First
Amendment framework described above in Part II. Bans on false political
advertisements, already enacted in several states, are similar to proposals for
source disclosures in paid political advertisements in that they are insufficient
to remedy the harms caused by fake news. As stated above, the fake news
problem is not largely concerned with false advertising because false stories
usually come in the form of unpaid content that is disguised as real news.165
False political advertising bans have included malice or a specific intent
standard, which makes it difficult to hold its creators legally accountable.166
The ultimate downfall of these statutes, though, is their imposition of
criminal liability.167 Alvarez was clear that criminal liability for false
political speech is impermissible because of the potential for government
158. Id.
159. See Kruse, supra note 23, at 158–61.
160. See Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1058–59.
161. Thomas Kane, Note, Malice, Lies, and Videotape: Revisiting New York Times v.
Sullivan in the Modern Age of Political Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 755, 791–93 (1999).
162. Kruse, supra note 23, at 169–70.
163. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested Framework for
Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions of Lies in Political Campaigns, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. 167, 222–23 (2018).
164. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part I.B.
166. See Joshua S. Sellers, Legislating Against Lying in Campaigns and Elections,
71 OKLA. L. REV. 141, 149–50 (2018).
167. See id. at 149–50 nn.53–56.
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abuse.168 The looming threat of criminal sanctions on speakers using paid
advertisements to convey political messages—particularly those without a
demonstrated material harm—would chill true speech and therefore fail a
constitutional challenge. Thus far, courts have struck down these statutes in
states where challenges have been brought.169
Likewise, false election speech statutes will likely meet a similar
constitutional demise. Criminalizing malicious and false political speech,
including falsehoods about ballot measures or matters of election
administration, is unconstitutional under an Alvarez analysis because it
would give the government leverage to prosecute only its critics,170 though a
demonstrated material harm to listeners might save these statutes from
judicial nullification.171 Even so, false claims about ballot initiatives and
election administration are only a small part of the problem; a false speech
restriction would need to apply far more broadly to fight fake news.
Some of the proposals outlined in this section—like amending the CDA,
enacting disclosure requirements for online advertisements, and prohibiting
false election speech where constitutionally permissible—should be enacted
because they provide a partial remedy for the fake news problem. But
scholars’ inability to come up with a constitutionally permissible and
complete remedy invites the question: Is it possible to directly regulate fake
news given the powerful First Amendment protections for free speech?
B. Inability to Restrict Fake News Directly
The strict confines of Alvarez leave little room for fake news regulation.
In Alvarez, the Stolen Valor Act ultimately failed because the government
believed that false speech about military honors was less troublesome than a
“Ministry of Truth” regulating falsehoods.172 Regulating fake news, then,
involves “choosing the lesser evil” between the harms caused by false speech
and the chilling effects restrictions might produce.173 So, a regulation is more
likely to pass constitutional muster where the harms caused by fake news are
“particularly acute and where the risk of government abuse is significantly
limited in some manner.”174
Because the maliciously deceitful and carelessly erroneous publishers of
fake news are indistinguishable to viewers and cause the same confusion and
distrust, a viable fake news remedy must address all falsehoods in the news.
A fake news regulation restricting speech on the basis of its falsity would be
subject to strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court acknowledges that “it

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See Sellers, supra note 166, at 150.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See Han, supra note 34, at 195.
See id.
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is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny,”175
but there are a number of false speech restrictions, described in Part II.B, that
have survived this review.176 The state has many compelling interests that
would justify regulation, including ensuring that voters choose qualified
candidates, protecting voters from fraud that might otherwise prevent them
from voting, shielding elections from foreign interference, maintaining a
strong press as a check on government corruption, and preserving a lively
ideas marketplace, all of which are threatened by fake news.177 To meet strict
scrutiny, then, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve those compelling
state interests. As stated earlier, true counterspeech is a less restrictive
remedy, so the constitutionality of a false speech restriction would depend on
the efficacy of truth.
The Alvarez Court overestimated the power of true counterspeech.
Although the plurality and concurrence in Alvarez both noted that the Stolen
Valor Act was not narrowly tailored because there was an available remedy
less restrictive than a criminal statute—creating a database of those awarded
military honors—their assertion that true counterspeech is an effective
remedy is misguided.178 Justice Kennedy fortifies his defense of the truth as
an effective remedy by citing to Justice Holmes’s conception of the
marketplace of ideas: “The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.’”179 But this mischaracterizes the ideas marketplace: it is the
free trade of ideas, not facts, that enriches debate and allows the public to
The concurring justices, too,
make informed voting decisions.180
misunderstood both Justice Holmes and Mill when contending that false
statements of fact add value to political debate.181 The reasoning underlying
the Court’s defense of true counterspeech as an adequate remedy to false
speech is not only predicated on misinterpreted philosophical theories, but it
also ignores the problem that, in a marketplace of facts, the truth does not
always prevail.182
175. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a statute prohibiting
solicitation of votes and display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a
polling place met strict scrutiny requirements).
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729 (2012) (plurality opinion).
179. Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
180. See supra Part I.A.
181. Justice Breyer writes that “false factual statements are less likely than are true factual
statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at
732 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Later, Justice Breyer cites to Mill in support of
his assertion that examination of a false statement of fact can “promote a form of thought that
ultimately helps realize the truth.” Id. at 733. Not only does this misunderstand the free trade
of ideas as a truth-seeking mechanism, but it also ignores long-held precedent that false
statements of fact that a reasonable person would believe to be true do not have any
constitutional value. See id. at 746–47 (Alito, J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974).
182. See supra Part I.B.
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True counterspeech has proven an ineffective remedy to fake news
because people do not “buy” more truth than false news. While free
exchange of ideas might lead to discovery of ideological “truth” as Mill once
contemplated,183 free exchange of facts obscures it. Because fake news
appears to be true, targets people susceptible to deception, and spreads more
widely than legitimate news, true counterspeech is powerless in the facts
marketplace: How can truth prevail over falsehoods when people cannot
distinguish one from the other? The counterspeech doctrine fails to address
the ways that technological advancements have affected news consumption
and that psychological predispositions cause people to hold onto incorrect
beliefs, even when presented with evidence to the contrary.184 Much like in
a marketplace of goods, a marketplace of facts might persuade viewers to
“buy” information “packaged” in ways that appeal to their superficial
preferences rather than the information’s actual value.185 In fact, a wealth of
scientific evidence indicates that many factors wholly unrelated to the quality
of information affect which statements of fact people “buy” in the
information marketplace.186 The marketplace of ideas metaphor is also a
flawed way of understanding free speech because of its inherent assumption
that participants are seeking to find “truth” in good faith.187 In reality, many
bad faith self-interested speakers promote ideas for personal gain rather than
to benefit the public good. These inefficiencies, much like in economic
markets, lead to market failure in the ideas marketplace.
Moreover, true counterspeech fails to address other harms caused by fake
news. In justifying the counterspeech doctrine, the Alvarez Court failed to
consider the ways that protections for listeners further the goals of the ideas
marketplace—namely, to enable the public to form reasoned opinions in a
democratic society. Because false stories undermine readers’ basis for trust
and reliance on news,188 the unchecked distribution of false stories online
will continue to cause distrust in the media. Counterspeech cannot restore
183. See supra Part I.A.
184. Napoli, supra note 26, at 67–68.
185. Hundley, supra note 16, at 503.
186. See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 909–
10 (2010). Professor Schauer notes that
[o]nce we fathom the full scope of factors other than the truth of a proposition that
might determine which propositions individuals or groups will accept and which
they will reject—the charisma, authority, or persuasiveness of the speaker; the
consistency between the proposition and the prior beliefs of the hearer; the
consistency between the proposition and what the hearer believes that other hearers
believe; the frequency with which the proposition is uttered; the extent to which the
proposition is communicated with photographs and other visual or aural
embellishments; the extent to which the proposition will make the reader or listener
feel good or happy for content-independent reasons; and almost countless others—
we can see that placing faith in the superiority of truth over all of these other
attributes of a proposition in explaining acceptance and rejection requires a
substantial degree of faith in pervasive human rationality and an almost willful
disregard of the masses of scientific and marketing research to the contrary.
Id. at 909.
187. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
188. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 139.
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readers’ trust and confidence in the news. A failure to address this problem
allows the decline in traditional media to continue, thereby decreasing its
power as a check on government.189 Because true counterspeech has failed
to prevent widespread deception and distrust, a more restrictive alternative is
constitutionally permissible.
In theory, a statute could be narrowly tailored by limiting liability in a
number of ways that would prevent government abuse. A regulation might
require a showing of material harm.190 In Alvarez, the Court found that while
the aggregate of lies about military honors may dilute their value, a single lie
may not have a significant harmful effect.191 Similarly, while every piece of
fake news contributes to broad harms to democracy, not every false story
causes significant harm. A fake news restriction might be limited to false
stories that generate a particular amount of engagement on social media
under a presumption that a certain number of likes, shares, or comments
evidences significant disruption of political speech.
A regulation might also be narrowed in scope by limiting liability based
on time or forum. In 2016, fake news was particularly prevalent during the
final three months of the presidential campaign,192 so false speech
restrictions might be confined to the months before major elections. Because
errors are unavoidable in open discourse,193 only published false statements
could be restricted. Beyond this, the forums might be limited to social media
platforms or websites with a certain number of subscribers.
Though a fake news regulation might square with the Alvarez
understanding of the First Amendment in theory, practical concerns make it
highly unlikely that any restriction on fake news would be both constitutional
and effective. Imposing civil or criminal liability on fake news publishers
would require a finding of actual malice, which would be impracticable for
fake news shared by many unknown sources online. In the abstract, a statute
could avoid the actual malice standard and impose strict liability on false
news without chilling true speech194 by imposing symbolic damages: for
example, a court might issue a decree of falsity.195 However, such a
regulation would be unlikely to deter publishers from creating and hosting
false stories and would not be able to reverse the harm caused by multitudes
of social media users seeing and believing the content. Furthermore, judicial
hurdles beyond the First Amendment also create barriers to any direct
prohibition on fake news. Without a concrete and particularized harm,
plaintiffs would not have standing to bring actions against fake news
189. See supra Part I.B.
190. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
191. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725–26 (2012) (plurality opinion). Consider
the lie “made in a barely audible whisper.” See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
192. Silverman, supra note 31.
193. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part II.C.1.
195. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 768 n.2 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (“I can therefore discern nothing in the Constitution which forbids a
plaintiff to obtain a judicial decree that a statement is false—a decree he can then use in the
community to clear his name and to prevent further damage . . . .”).
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publishers in federal court, which means general harms to democratic
institutions would not be legally actionable.196 State action against online
republishers would likely be preempted by § 230, which makes liability in
states with lenient standing requirements untenable.197
Given the Supreme Court’s failure to afford substantial protections for
listeners in its First Amendment jurisprudence and the government’s inability
to restrict false news following Alvarez, an entirely new approach is
necessary to fight fake news.
IV. LICENSING PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS
A solution to the fake news problem should enhance the truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas by incorporating both Millian
protections that enable speakers to feel comfortable contributing to public
discourse without fear of liability and Kantian protections that allow listeners
to receive credible information to help inform their opinions. By
encompassing both protections for speakers and listeners, fake news
regulation should ensure that “everything worth saying shall be said”198
while eliminating market inefficiencies caused by bad faith speakers who
seek to manipulate and deceive listeners rather than participate in the search
for ideological truth and public good.199
One plausible way to achieve this balance between protections for
speakers and listeners would be to license professional journalists in the same
way as other professionals. Journalists’ special access to information
justifies regulation of this sort. As nonlawyers and nondoctors are unable to
access specialized information about law or medicine, lay people are unable
to independently evaluate the quality of information in the facts
marketplace.200 Because professionals serve important roles that are
inaccessible to others, clients of professionals “are entitled to rely on the truth
and accuracy of the professional’s judgment.”201 Similarly, journalists often
have investigatory resources and press privileges bestowing them with
information that others cannot access; like clients of other professionals,
media consumers should be able to trust journalists and rely on information
they distribute as intermediaries between information sources and media
consumers.202 Lawyers and doctors are expected to put the well-being of
their clients over their own interests because they serve important roles that
enhance the public good.203 It follows that journalists could put the interests

196. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992).
197. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”).
198. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
201. See POST, supra note 15, at 47.
202. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
203. See POST, supra note 15, at 47–48.
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of their listeners over their own because of their essential role as guardians
of democratic discourse.204
Regulation of journalists as professionals would enhance protections for
listeners while maintaining the same level of participation from speakers in
the ideas marketplace. First, professional journalists would be subject to
statutory disciplinary rules that ensure ethical reporting. These rules would
require journalists, when acting in their professional capacities, to reasonably
investigate facts and accurately convey reported information. An ethics code
of this sort would help alleviate the fake news problem by providing the
public with trusted sources of factual information. Because people have
difficulty identifying fake news and fact-checking their sources, a group of
state-approved, but not public, professional journalists and legitimate news
organizations would enable people to rely on the information they receive
from these sources. Restored trust in legitimate media would also bolster its
ability to act as a watchdog of government and combat the deleterious effect
that fake news has on influencing public opinion.205
Second, professional journalists would be required to continue journalistic
education throughout their careers in order to maintain their special status.
Continuing education in information gathering using new technology and
best practices on how to avoid manipulation by malevolent actors would
ensure that the public receives high-quality factual information from
journalists. This information would better serve democracy by giving the
public an enhanced ability to develop informed opinions.206
Finally, these regulations would not preclude nonjournalists from
publishing news. This means that lay people would be able to contribute as
much speech, valuable or otherwise, to the ideas marketplace without fear of
government prosecution or oversight.207 Speakers would retain broad
freedoms in sharing information. But listeners would no longer be as
susceptible to manipulation by deceitful speakers because they would have
reliable, state-licensed sources to turn to in order to better inform their
decisions. To ensure that journalists are able to speak freely as citizens as
well as professionals, they would be required to disclose that they are not
speaking in their professional capacities when making statements directed to
the public at large.
Licensed journalists who violate the ethics code or fail to meet their
continuing education requirements could be reported to state boards for
investigation. If found to have negligently violated state licensing rules,
these professional journalists would not be subject to civil fines or criminal
punishments that would be construed as burdens on free speech.208 They
would instead lose their professional licenses, but they would be free to
continue publishing their stories as laypersons.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Although regulation of professionals is typically considered outside the
purview of the First Amendment,209 it is possible that this regulatory regime
could be considered a content-based speech regulation because it
discriminates against false content. But it would likely survive strict scrutiny
review. Ethical oversight of journalists serves compelling government
interests of enabling free and open discourse and protecting election
integrity.210 Because true counterspeech is ineffective in countering fake
news,211 this slightly more restrictive remedy is permissible. It is narrowly
tailored to achieving the compelling government interests described above
because it addresses provable harms to democracy and does not chill speech
by threatening civil or criminal liability to speakers who assert false political
claims.
CONCLUSION
The fake news problem presents a number of threats to U.S. democracy
because it undermines people’s ability to rely on information sources and
interferes with their ability to form reasoned opinions and make rational
decisions as citizens. Both an informed public and a strong press are crucial
to democratic self-governance. Fake news threatens democracy by making
citizens vulnerable to manipulation that could cause them to vote against their
interests, adopt unfounded beliefs, or distrust legitimate media. Although the
First Amendment protects false speech, the broad protections for
constitutionally valueless and harmful fake news are inconsistent with its
goals of ensuring that the marketplace of ideas is robust and efficient.
Statutory rules licensing professional journalists would be one permissible
way to fight fake news within the confines of the First Amendment.

209. See POST, supra note 15, at 53.
210. See supra Part I.B.
211. See supra Part III.B.

